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Abstract The identification of strategic groups in the Spanish franchising area is the
main aim of this study. The authors have added some new strategic variables (not
used before) to the study and have classified franchisors between sectors and
distribution strategy. The results reveal the existence of four perfectly differentiated
strategic groups (types of franchisors). One of the major implications of this study is
that the variables that build a strategic group vary depending on the respective sector
the network operates in and its distribution strategy. This fact indicates that including
sector and distribution strategy is absolutely necessary to achieve good classifica-
tions of franchisor types.
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Over the past three decades franchising has blossomed into a major business form
(Tuunanen and Hyrsky 2001). The franchising system presents a series of typical
features. First, its increasing importance in the area of commercial distribution.
Secondly, the constant increase of franchisors and franchisees—this being valid for a
wide spectrum of countries from those that are developing to the ones most advanced
commercially. For example, in The United States at the end of the 1980s, the
franchising system was valued as representing around 34% (Díez and Galán 1989) and
at present it is thought to be over 50% of the retailer trade (Falbe et al. 1999).
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In Spain franchising initiated its takeoff in the 80s and its market share in the
retailer trade was practically non-existent at that time. Yet, 742 franchisors and
52,346 franchisees were operating in 2004 (Tormo and Asociados 2005), according
to the information of the 2005 yearbook of the AEF (Spanish Franchisors’
Association). The participation of the franchising system in retailing is over 10%
and with a high growth trend. What’s more, franchising represents 8% of the whole
of retailing outlets in Spain.
The franchising system, therefore, continues its high development by contributing
importantly to the modernization of retailing. Nevertheless, the authors think that the
research on franchising has not followed an advance parallel to the evolution of the
sector. The reasons for this might be of a diverse nature (Díez and Rondán 2004).
First, the scarce study of the institutions or distribution companies and the secretive
clauses of the franchising that make it difficult to obtain answers from franchisors
and franchisees. Secondly, the complexity of the treatment of franchising on the
behalf of the researchers. Finally, franchising demands knowledge of whole areas of
firms (organization, marketing, and financial economy and accounting) and juridical
aspects (especially commercial law).
Nonetheless, the situation has currently experienced an important change and
prestigious scientific journals are publishing research of a good scientific level.
Based on the work of Elango and Fried (1997), Díez et al. (2004) built a new
classification of the research lines on franchising. They appointed topics where the
research has been important and others where it was practically non-existent but
interesting for future research. The main research streams on franchising are exposed
in Table 1.
In Table 2 some of the most important research on franchisors are summarized.
The main topics in this research stream are: reasons to franchise, own units versus
franchised units, franchising internationalization, franchisees’ choice, franchisees’
units location and strategic groups. These research lines and the main articles related
are shown in Table 2.
The present research can be included within the “strategic groups” research
stream, inside of the research about franchisors, since the authors propose analyzing
the different types of strategic groups that the franchisors develop in Spain. The
exploratory nature of this study is due to the fact that new variables, not previously
used in this context, have been included in the topic of franchising strategic groups.
In this context, what are the aims of this research?
1. To study the existence of “types of franchisors” from the configuration of
strategic groups in the Spanish franchising system. This objective will allow us
to characterize the different characteristics of the Spanish franchising chains.
2. To add new variables that are considered strategic to conform better-defined
types of franchisors. Also, an explanation of groups by sectors should be made.
To achieve these objectives, the following structure has been proposed. After this
introduction, different existing contributions to the study of strategic groups in the
area of franchising have been analyzed. The third section is focused on the
justification of new variables for the identification of strategic groups in franchising.
Then, the methodology necessary to extract the results of the research from the
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development of an empirical study is proposed. A database composed of 140
franchising chains from the information included in the Supplement of the National
Magazine “Emprendedores” (no. 86, November 2004) is analyzed. Two analyses
have been run, the first using the same variables as Carney and Gedajlovic (1991),
and the second adding other important strategic variables. In “Discussion,
implications for management, limitations and future research,” the main results are
shown. Finally, the discussion and main implications for managers, the limitations of
the study and the future research are presented.
Literature background on strategic groups in franchising
The term “strategic group” was introduced by Hunt (1972) in order to describe the
structure of a sector in relation to the companies that compete in it. Since then, it has
Table 1 Proposed classification of researches on franchising
The main research streams on franchising
1. Social reasons for
franchising
(a) Social balance of franchising (e) Franchising favours
competition
(b) Franchising contract (f) Social advantages
(c) Social-economics advantages (g) Social inconvenients
(d) Ethic in franchising
2. Franchisor (a) Reasons to franchise —Financial resources
—Staff
—Market knowledge
—Others
(b) Own units versus franchised units
(c) Franchising Internationalization
(d) Choice of franchisees
(e) Franchisees units location
(f) Strategic Groups
3. Franchisee (a) Reasons for integration in a
franchise system
—Independence of franchisee
—Risk in franchising
(b) Choice of franchisor —Franchise system choice
—Franchisor choice technics
—Information provided by the
franchisor
4. Franchisor/franchisee
relationships
(a) Structure —Power
—Leadership
—Dependence
—Control
(b) Behaviour —Cooperation
—Opportunism
—Conflict
—Trust
(c) Economic performance —Profit
—Profitability
—Market share
(d) Not economic performance —Commitment
—Satisfaction
—Loyalty
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Table 2 Research on franchisors
Studies conducted on franchisors
Reasons to franchise
Castrogiovanni and Justis
(2002), Alon (2001)
They study the correlation between the growth, the size and age of the
franchise system
Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969),
Alon (2001)
The main reason of growing in franchising is for financial resources
Alon (2001), Julian and
Castrogiovanni (1995)
The main reason of growing in franchising is in the human resources:
quality, motivation, opportunism, etc.
Norton (1988a), Dant (1994) The reasons to franchise are financial resources and human capital
Kaufmann and Lafontaine
(1994), Alon (2001)
Reasons of control of the sale units impel to franchising
López and Ventura (2002) Franchising become cheaper the control when it is difficult to
supervise to the contracting parties
Own units versus franchised units
Bradach and Eccles (1989) The own and franchised units have positive impacts of administration
each one with others
Lafontaine and Kaufmann
(1994)
When limited resources exist, during the first phases of growth of the
chain, greater necessity of franchised units exists
Martin (1988), Dant et al. (1992) They offer a relationship of advantages to maintain franchised units
Norton (1988b) They show the conditions in which is more appropriate the own units
in front of the franchised ones
Thompson (1992) The own units are usually located in urban and/or high population
density areas
Anderson (1984), Bracker and
Pearson (1986)
Differences don’t exist between the sales of own and franchised units
Shelton (1967) The sales in franchised units overcome to the own ones
Thomas et al. (1990) The transformation of franchised in own units is usually given when
the first ones reach high sales
Calderón (1998) She analyzes the explanatory variables that influence the choice
between own and franchised units
Cliquet and Croizean (2002) They offer advantages and inconveniences of maintaining own and
franchised units
Franchising Internationalization
Huszagh et al. (1992) There are two reasons that impel to the internationalization: age of the
chain and number of operative units
Kedia et al. (1994) The managers impel internationalization by reasons of growth and benefits
Hackett (1976) The reasons for the internationalization are to take advantages in
markets of great potential and fame
Kedia et al. (1995), López and
González (2001)
Market saturation, disposition of intangible resources and the
experience in the control system are the main reasons for the
internationalization
Aydin and Kacker (1990) The reasons of the American managers that don’t go abroad are: the
perception of wide opportunities of growth in their country, lack of
international experience and limited financial resources
Zietlow (1995) The best form of consenting to the franchising internationalization is
the master franchising
Chan and Justis (1993) The great regulation of the franchising and high level of litigations in
USA make more difficult the entrance that in Europe
Alon and Banai (2000) Franchising in Russia is more appropriate for chains which have more
resources with aspirations of growth and long term benefits
Welsh et al. (2006) The authors develop a conceptual model relating international retail
franchising to its stakeholders. A review of the research is divided
into areas of the emerging world market: Central and Eastern Europe,
Mexico and South America, Asia, and other areas that include India,
Kuwait, and South Africa.
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been one of the basic supports upon which the development of Strategic
Management has been sustained as a knowledge area.
A strategic group can be defined as a set of companies that, within a sector of
activity or industry, develops a similar strategy from its strategic dimensions (Porter
1979). It does not mean that they should have identical performances (Combs et al.
2004), since they can differ with respect to their resources, skills or capacities
(Thomas and Carroll 1994; McNamara et al. 2003).
The strategic groups allow the explanation of the competitive position of every
company of the sector in relation to its competitors. Therefore, the study and analysis of
the strategic groups in a managerial sector helps its structure to be understood, as well as
the dynamics of the competition and the evolution of the sector itself (Barroso et al. 2001).
In any case, the identification of strategic groups needs the fulfillment of two
necessary and complementary conditions (Nath and Gruca 1997):
& The variables or dimensions that define the strategy are really strategic and,
therefore, they cannot be modified in the short term. Its modification would
Table 2 (Continued)
Studies conducted on franchisors
Quinn and Alexander (2002) They conceptualize the adoption of franchising in the international
retailer context
Choice of franchisees
Fenwick and Strombon (1998) Franchisees with little or any previous experience in the business
management obtain better results
Shane (1998) Franchisees with more rates of success are those that have previous
experience
Morrison (1997) Franchisees with high consent and low extroversion leads to develop
good franchisor–franchisee relationships
Franchisees units location
Gosh and Craig (1991) They proposed the “Fransys” model for location of franchised units
Kaufmann and Rangan (1990) The opening of new franchised units benefits to the existent ones
Strategic groups
Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) They found five franchisor types in Canada: “Rapid Growers,”
“Conservative Expensive,” “Franchise Converts,” “Mature
Franchisors” and “Unsuccessful”
Castrogiovanni et al. (1995) They looked for franchisor types in the USA confirming some of the
groups of Carney and Gedajlovic (1991)
Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) Based on Mintzberg (1979) organizational typology, identified three
franchising configurations: entrepreneurial, confederation, and
Carbon-copy form.
López and Ventura (2001) Detected the existence of five strategic groups in the Spanish
franchising system: emergent, standardized, large internationals,
traditional and unsatisfactory
Combs et al. (2004) Based on the Agency Theory and the Resource Scarcity Theory and
on a sample of 65 restaurant chains, they find three strategic groups:
“agency franchisors,” “agency franchise minimizers,” “resource
scarce franchisors”
Johnson and Alon (2006) Confirms empirically the three configurations identified by
Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998), showing three clusters roughly
equivalent to the confederation form (cluster 1), carbon copy form
(cluster 2), and entrepreneurial form (cluster 3) organizations.
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suppose incurring high change costs, such as high investments in both
tangible resources (monetary, human, etc.) and intangible (learning, know-
how, etc.). When this condition is not complied with, the identification of
strategic groups within a sector will be difficult, in spite of using appropriate
statistical tools (factor analysis, cluster, etc.), as Nath and Sudharshan (1994)
indicated.
& The difficulty of modifying the variables that define the managerial strategies in
the short term should create barriers of mobility among the different strategic
groups that prevent or impede the movement of companies from one group to
others. Their main characteristic is that they last a long time. Therefore, mobility
barriers are a source of competitive advantage for the members of the group that
have them and cannot be rapidly obtained by the components of other groups
(Barroso et al. 2001).
In consequence, the strategic groups can be considered as groups of firms that are
separated from each other depending on the mobility barriers that determine their
competitive behaviour. These mobility barriers are one of the reasons that explain the
differences with regards to the performance of the different strategic groups (Lee et al.
2002).
The identification and analysis of strategic groups has been carried out in different
contexts of activity: the pharmaceutical industry (Cool and Schendel 1987), the
banking sector (Mas 1996; McNamara et al. 2003), retailing (Barroso et al. 2001),
the hospital sector (Nath and Sudharshan 1994; Nath and Gruca 1997), the hotel
sector (Baum and Mezias 1992), the insurance sector (Fiegenbaum and Thomas
1990), internationalization (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1985), etc.
The relevance of this topic is that finding strategic groups is valuable for
empirical research in franchising. Focusing on specific groups avoids heterogeneity
in the sample, thereby making it more appropriate to draw general conclusions from
any study’s results. For this reason, these approaches have spread into franchising.
With respect to this issue, a pioneering work in the scientific research on types of
franchisors is that of Carney and Gedajlovic (1991). They worked with a Canadian
sample of 128 franchising chains that operated in Quebec.
They used 13 measures, which are theoretically strategic variables, grouped into
seven strategic dimensions: chain size, age, chain rate growth, cost of adhesion to the
franchise chain, contractual preventions, dispersion of units and vertical integration.
Based on the results obtained, they identified five types of strategies that franchisors
were following in their business expansion (rapid growers, conservative expensive,
franchise converts, mature franchisors, unsuccessful). Each strategy would be
identified with a type of franchisor (strategic group). Carney and Gedajlovic
(1991) insisted on the need to reply to their study, due to the importance of verifying
and generalizing their results.
This challenge was taken on by Castrogiovanni et al. (1995), who developed
a research using a sample of franchisors from The United States. Data were
extracted from the magazine “Entrepreneur” in 1991, having 717 franchising
chains belonging to 28 sectors. Castrogiovanni et al. (1995) confirm entirely the
strategies of “rapid growth franchisors” and “reconverted” and partially “mature
franchisors.” Nevertheless, the “expensive conservative” and “not successful”
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strategic groups were identified by different variables to those of Carney and
Gedajlovic (1991).
Also, Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998), based on Mintzberg’s (1979) organiza-
tional typology, identified three franchising configurations (strategic group):
entrepreneurial, confederation, and carbon-copy. The age and size of franchisors is
an important variable in determining the most appropriate organizational configu-
ration. The entrepreneurial form is associated with franchisors that are relatively
young. This configuration tends to be transitory, since the franchisor typically
switches to a more complex organizational form as it gains experience, and
franchisors with a large number of outlets are associated with the confederation and
carbon-copy forms. Confederation and carbon-copy forms of franchising are
differentiated by the need for autonomy and loose coupling in the case of the
former, and by the need for tight financial and operational controls in the latter. The
carbon-copy form is associated with franchisors that have developed a highly
repetitive, standardized product or service and seek economies of scale and scope by
replicating franchise units in new markets (Castrogiovanni and Justis 1998). In order
to minimize costs and capture economies of scale, they maintain tight control over
all aspects of the operation from the selection of franchise locations to the design of
facilities and training of staff. The business model has been tried and tested (Johnson
and Alon 2006), so high start-up costs can be expected so that the franchisee can
replicate every aspect of the business. In order to maximize growth in new markets,
franchisors using this configuration are more likely to offer financial incentives to
franchisees, such as preferential financing of the start-up costs.
Recently, Johnson and Alon (2006) empirically confirmed the three configu-
rations identified by Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998), showing three clusters
roughly equivalent to the confederation form (cluster 1), carbon-copy form (cluster 2),
and entrepreneurial form (cluster 3). The confederation type is the most active in
franchising (the outlets are 94% franchised) and it takes a short time to start
franchising (5.6 years). The franchising start-up costs are slightly larger than for the
entrepreneurial type, but significantly less than the carbon copy form. However, they
are the ones most prepared to offer financing to franchisees, with most franchisors
providing financing for equipment, the start-up fee, inventory, and the franchising fee.
This result suggests that the confederation type need to offer greater financial
incentives to prospective franchisees than the other categories of franchisors do.
Furthermore, this is the configuration that employs master franchising most frequently
in their international expansion strategies.
The carbon-copy franchising type is the oldest group and it is also the largest, and
took the longest to become franchising-bound (17.1 years). It is the group with the
highest total number of outlets. However, it represents the smallest number of
franchisors who seek international franchisees. The carbon-copy franchisor is the
least franchised with an average franchising rate among its outlets of 80.2%. It uses
the company-owned outlets to test new concepts of markets, products and processes,
rather than letting the franchisees experiment as in the case of the confederated form.
The carbon-copy form is similar in organizational characteristics to the “mature
franchisors” identified by Carney and Gedajlovic (1991).
Finally, the entrepreneurial franchising organizations are the youngest of the three
clusters. They have the smallest number of outlets and on average they franchise
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Table 3 Relevant literature of strategic groups in franchising
Carney and
Gedajlovic (1991)
(Québec; Canadá)
Sample: 128
Method: factor
analysis
Castrogiovanni
et al. (1995)
USA Sample:
717 Method:
factor analysis
López and
Ventura (2001)
Spain Sample:
228 Method:
factor analysis
Inma and Debowski
(2006) Australia
Sample: 91 Method:
cluster analysis
Johnson and Alon
(2006) USA Sample:
261 Method: cluster
analysis
Group: Rapid
growers
Group 1 Group 1:
Standardizable
Group 1: Beginners Group 1:
Confederation
Franchise openings
per year
Franchising
growth
Average
investment
Young and small
franchisors and had the
lowest number of
franchise established
outlets and the lowest
entry fee
The minimum number
of years before it
began franchisingNetwork
growth
Outlet openings per
year
Network size Surface of the
place
The most prepared to
offer financing to
franchisees
% Initial
franchise fee
It employs master
franchising most
frequentlyOver initial
investment
Group:
Conservatives
expensive
Group 2 Group 2:
Emergent
Group 2: Developers Group 2: Carbon
copy form is similar
to mature franchisor
of Carney and
Gedajlovic
Average investment Franchise fee Initial franchise
fee
Charged moderately
high fees. Few had
achieved a nation-wide
expansion but they
adopted early
geographical expansion
Initial franchise fee Advertising
royalty
Royalties
Contract length Geographic
breadth
Advertising fee
Group: Converters Group 3 Group 3:
Traditional
Group 3: Growers Group 3: The
entrepreneurial
franchising type is
similar to Carney and
Gedajlovic’s Rapid
Growers
No. of years
between inception
and establishment
of first franchise
Pre-franchising
interval
No. of years
between
inception and
establishment
of first
franchise
They had more fully
developed systems and
could afford an
expeditious growth.
They were the largest
franchise network. The
profile of the growers
closely matched that of
the “rapid growers”
No. of years since
inception
Firm age Firm age
Group: Mature
franchisors
Group 4 Group 4:
International
Group 4: Matures
No. of years since
first franchise
Years
franchising
Establishments
in Spain with
regard to the
whole chain
Selling their new
franchises at an
extremely high price.
They are costly and
select the franchisee
candidates who can
make a substantial
investment. This is
reflected in the high
percentage of
company-owned outlets
Number of outlets Reliance on
franchising
No. of outlets
% of outlets in
Quebec (negative
sign)
% of outlets
franchisees
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about 88.6%. The entrepreneurial franchising type has the lowest operational costs,
which include start-up cost, franchise fee, and royalties. In addition, the
entrepreneurial franchising firm is the least likely to expand internationally only
via master franchising. The entrepreneurial type is similar to Carney and
Gedajlovic’s (1991) “rapid growers” type.
Inma and Debowski (2006) have recently published an article describing the
characteristics of 91 Australian franchise firms. They found four franchise groups
using hierarchical cluster analysis. “The Beginners” were young and small
franchisors and had the lowest number of franchise established outlets and the
lowest entry fee. “The Developers” type charged moderately high fees. Few had
achieved a nation-wide expansion but they adopted early geographical expansion
reflecting their need to build up their system format. “The Growers” had spent a
substantial time in the franchise business. They had more fully developed systems
and could afford an expeditious growth. They were the largest franchise network.
The profile of the growers closely matched that of the “rapid growers” identified by
Carney and Gedajlovic (1991). Finally, “The Matures” attained a conservative value
of retail expansion by selling their new franchises at an extremely high price. They
are costly and select the franchisee candidates who can make a substantial
investment and can contribute to the image of the chain. If that kind of investor is
not available, the matures prefer to own and operate their retail outlets. This is
reflected in the high percentage of company-owned outlets. The major innovation of
this study is the incorporation of performance measures in the analysis. They
suggested that the franchising industry is heterogeneous and its characteristics can be
used to predict the levels of the group performance.
López and Ventura (2001) published another article continuing this research
stream. Their database was made up from various Spanish Franchising Yearbooks,
supported by surveys. The sample was formed by 228 franchisors operating in Spain
in 1996. The results of López and Ventura’s work (2001) detected the existence of
five strategic groups that they called: emergent, standardized, large internationals,
traditional and unsatisfactory. These authors affirm that, though they should use a
different denomination: “globally, the identified groups are equivalent to those of
Carney and Gedajlovic’s study.”
Table 3 (Continued)
Carney and
Gedajlovic (1991)
(Québec; Canadá)
Sample: 128
Method: factor
analysis
Castrogiovanni
et al. (1995)
USA Sample:
717 Method:
factor analysis
López and
Ventura (2001)
Spain Sample:
228 Method:
factor analysis
Inma and Debowski
(2006) Australia
Sample: 91 Method:
cluster analysis
Johnson and Alon
(2006) USA Sample:
261 Method: cluster
analysis
Group:
Unsuccessful
Group 5 Group 5:
Unsatisfactory
% of outlets
franchises
Franchise start-
up costs
(negative sign)
Contract length
Fees per year (% of
sales) (negative
sign)
Sales royalty
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However, one of the most recent works published on strategic groups in the area
of franchising is the article of Combs et al. (2004). Based on the agency theory and
the resource scarcity theory and on a sample of 65 restaurant chains, they found
three strategic groups, but they focused on one sector—restaurant chains—and this
fact might distort their comparability.
In summary, Table 3 provides a comparison between the relevant articles that
have focused on strategic groups in the context of franchising.
New variables for the identification of strategic groups in franchising
The variables analysed to study strategic groups are based on the theories that try to
determine the reasons that lead firms to adopting the franchising. There are two
theories that have received a major scientific support (Alon 2001; Combs and
Ketchen 2003):
a. Resource Scarcity Theory. Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) proposed that firms
franchise in order to access to scarce resources, particularly capital and
managerial resources, their purpose being a quick expansion. Traditional
measures of resources include size, age and rate of growth (Combs and
Castrogiovanni 1994; Alon 2006). When firms are very young and small they
have difficulties obtaining money through traditional financial markets or from
existing operators, and, likewise, developing the indispensable managerial talent
is difficult for young firms (Shane 1996). Nonetheless, rapid expansion may be
essential in order to build the economies of scale in purchasing and advertising
which are necessary to compete effectively against established firms (Combs and
Castrogiovanni 1994). According to resource-scarcity theorists, the more
resources a firm has, the less it needs franchising to expand and, therefore, a
negative relation is expected between size, age, growth rate and the proportion
of franchisees versus own units (Alon 2006). Some authors assert that firms
develop franchising in their early years because of their lack of managerial
expertise and capital needed to grow, and franchisees are able to provide them
both (Combs and Ketchen 1999). Several studies have tried to explain
franchising expansion based on Resource Scarcity Theory postulates (for
example, Lafontaine and Kaufmann 1994; Norton 1995; Bradach 1998; Combs
et al. 2004; Castrogiovanni et al. 2006).
b. Agency Theory. Agency contracts consist of a relationship in which one part (the
principal) delegate authority to a second (the agent). Each part is assumed to be
self-interested and to have independent goals, so the principal has to drive
resources to ensure that the agent acts in the principal’s best interest. With regard
to franchising, franchisors act as principals delegating authority to other agents
(either employees, managers or franchisees). The principals have two basic tools
at their disposal to guarantee agent cooperation: monitoring agent behaviour and
offering incentives tied to agent outputs. Franchising largely alleviates
franchisors’ need for costly monitoring of unit managers because franchisees
are the ones most interested in improving their outlet’s profits (Norton 1988a).
Typically, franchisees make substantial investments in their outlets and the
anticipated profit stream from these investments depends on the franchisees
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continuing their best effort (Klein 1995). Therefore, franchisees are highly
motivated to maximize the performance of their outlets and, also, to reduce
franchisors’ need to monitor franchisees (Bradach 1998). Agency Theory claims
that firms franchise when doing so minimizes agency cost via the best available
alignment between outlet managers’ incentives and firms’ objectives. To sum
up, the geographical scope of operation, investment and royalty hypotheses have
all developed out of agency theory (Alon 2006). To minimize the amount of
monitoring needed, geographically dispersed units have a greater tendency to be
franchised as a further guarantor of investment and to train franchisees. This will
require large royalties to capture the value of intangibles such as brand-name,
trade-mark and know-how (Combs and Castrogiovanni 1994). The basic
principles of Agency Theory have been followed by many articles about
franchising (for example, Hunt 1973; Caves and Murphy 1976; Rubin 1978;
Mathewson and Winter 1985; Brickley and Dark 1987; Martin 1988; Sen 1993;
Norton 1988a, b; Brickley et al. 1991; Lafontaine 1992; Lafontaine and Shaw
1996; Shane 1996; Calderón 1998; López and Ventura 2002; Combs et al. 2004;
Castrogiovanni et al. 2006).
Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) and Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994) demonstrated
that both theories complement each other rather than being rivals and serve to explain
the reasons why firms adopt franchising. To summarize, it can be affirmed that the
main reasons that stimulate franchising are: scarcity of financial and human resources,
motivation of the franchisees, market knowledge and control of the franchisees.
In the first step of the study, the same 13 variables (7 strategic dimensions)
considered by Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) have been used in order to provide
useful comparisons to previous articles. The strategic dimensions: size, age, contract
length and rate of growth are supported by the resource scarcity theory. However,
dispersion and adhesion cost (investment and royalty) have all been developed based
on the agency theory (Combs and Castrogiovanni 1994). With regard to vertical
integration, both theories can be applied to support its use.
Then, in the second step of the study, 18 variables have been analyzed. Five new
variables that should be considered of great importance, from the strategic point of
view, have been added. All 13 previous variables are kept without modifications
with the exception of “Extension or geographical dispersion” that has been called
“Internationalization,” following López and Ventura (2001).
The five new variables are: “Minimum population required” (variable 14), “Total
shops in Spain” (variable 15), “Minimum size of the place” (variable 16), “Sector of
the company” (variable 17) and “Distribution strategy” (variable 18).
Variable 14 has been measured across the minimum population required to open a
franchised unit. This variable has been considered to be a measurement of
geographical dispersion (agency theory). It is evident that the less the required
population is to make a shop profitable, the more likely the opening in urban zones
of minor population and wide dispersion is. On the other hand, according to agency
theory (Lafontaine 1992; Lafontaine and Shaw 1996; Shane 1996; Combs et al.
2004; Castrogiovanni et al. 2006) it is possible to open a larger number of
establishments that also increases the costs of supervision and leads to a preference
for franchising. Nevertheless, according to the resource scarcity theory (Bradach
Int Entrep Manag J (2007) 3:355–377 365
1998; Combs et al. 2004; Castrogiovanni et al. 2006), this variable also might have
been included in the dimension costs of adhesion, since requiring less population
implies that the unit is going to have an area of exclusivity of less potential and,
therefore, a lower cost of adhesion.
The total number of shops in Spain is included inside the dimension size and it is
an indicator of the success of the chain in the country.
Variable 16, minimal surface required of the place, is fitted inside the dimension
costs of adhesion, since a bigger surface always implies a higher expenditure from
the franchisee side. This idea fits to the resource scarcity theory.
With regard to variable 17, sector or industry, is the most used classification and
the one more suitable for the proposed purpose has been followed. Three big sectors
or industries inside the franchising system are set up: sector 1: “Retailing,” sector 2:
“Services” and Sector 3: “Hotels and restaurants.”
Finally, with regard to variable 18, distribution strategy, two alternatives have
been considered: 1. Multi-channel strategy: the franchisor uses for its expansion both
its own and franchised units. 2. The franchisor uses a mono-channel distribution
strategy, that is to say, only franchised units.
In Table 4 all the variables analyzed are exposed.
Methodology
Database
The database used in this research is made up of 140 franchising chains included in
the Supplement of the National Magazine “Emprendedores” (no. 86, November,
Table 4 Strategic dimensions and operative variables
Strategic dimensions Operative variables
A. Size 01. Number of outlets of the chain in the world
15. Total shops in Spain
B. Dispersion 02. Internationalization
14. Minimum population required
C. Growth 03. Outlets opened per year
04. Outlets opened per year from the beginning of the franchise chain
D. Cost of adhesion (price of
franchising)
05. Average investment that the candidate needs to be a franchisee
06. Entry Fee
07. Royalty (percentage of sales)
08. Advertising fee (percentage of sales)
16. Minimum surface of the place
E. Contract 09. Contract length (years)
F. Vertical integration 10. Percentage of franchised units (confidence in franchising)
G. Timing 11. Age of the company (years since inception)
12. Years franchising
13. Years not franchising (years between inception and firs franchise)
H. Sector 17. Sector (retailing, services and hotels and restaurants)
I. Distribution strategy 18. Distribution strategy (multi-channel, mono-channel)
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2004). The 140 franchising chains that compose the sample (82% Spanish origin,
8% USA origin and the rest from various countries) include 19 different sectors and
have been selected by the magazine with the collaboration of a group of independent
experts from across the following criteria:
(a) Future.—Selection of firms that are likely to be successful.
(b) Franchisor chains.—The selected franchisor chains should have two own units
and one franchised unit, as a minimum. In this way, it is possible to assure that
the firm has developed its concept of business before.
(c) Age.—The selected companies have an experience of at least 3 years using
franchising. In this case, the commitment of the firm with the franchising as a
formula of expansion is guaranteed.
(d) Franchisor registration.—The companies included in the database are registered in
the Spanish Registry of Franchisors, which, besides being a legal imperative, which
many chains do not fulfill, supposes a new element of the commitment of
franchisors.
The information included in the supplement mentioned was obtained via personal
interviews with the general managers of the selected firms.
According to Alon (2001), databases from yearbooks and prestigious magazines
are frequently used in research about franchising at national (Combs and
Castrogiovanni 1994; Martin and Justis 1993) and international level (Alon 1999).
Even though, collected data are provided by franchisors, some researchers have
claimed that data from yearbooks do not suffer from severe biases because over 80%
of data are validated (Shane 1996; Combs and Castrogiovanni 1994).
Data analysis
As Nath and Gruca (1997) indicate, the identification of strategic groups in any
sector of activity can be done following three alternative and non-exclusive methods:
1. Factor Analysis and grouping information from archive data.
2. Construction of multidimensional scales (multidimensional scaling) from the
managerial perceptions of a set of specific attributes of the industry.
3. Identification and direct classification of the different competitive companies
from the analysis of executives of the sector.
The configuration of our database has been done from archive data. The first of
the methodologies proposed by Nath and Gruca (1997) has, therefore, been chosen.
This was also followed by Carney and Gedajlovic (1991), Castrogiovanni et al.
(1995) and, López and Ventura (2001).
In this respect, an exploratory factor analysis was carried out, imputing the
missing values with the average of every variable and applying rotation varimax
(this is a kind of orthogonal rotation). From the rotated components matrix, the
factors whose eigenvalues are over 1 have been retained. The classification of each
firm, in each of the groups, has been done paying attention to the highest factor score
reached by each of the franchising chains with regard to each of the resultant factors
of the factor analysis. The companies that did not obtain a factor score over 0.1 in
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any factor were not classified, following the recommendations of Carney and
Gedajlovic (1991) and López and Ventura (2001). Therefore, the grouped companies
were 88.
A contrast of averages for groups, using Kruskal–Wallis’ test, has been carried out
in order to verify if the franchisor groups in every factor differ significantly from
other groups. Then, the cluster analysis was used to generate alternative groups and
to compare them with the group that arose from the factor analysis.
Results
The first factor analysis was applied to the first 13 variables. The factor rotated
matrix (using an orthogonal rotation), after five iterations, reveals the existence of
four factors, which are those which have eigenvalues over one (Table 5).
Component or factor one would be formed by: “total investment,” “entry fee,”
“sales royalties” and “advertising fee,” that is, the variables related to the investment
necessary to adhere to the chain and the financial considerations that the franchisee
must carry out. Component two includes: “age of the firm,” “years franchising” and
“years pre-franchising.” Component 3 groups: “total outlets,” “percent of outlets in
Spain,” “outlets opened per year” and, with a minor correlation, “percentage of
franchisee units.” Component 4 groups: “contract length” and, with a small
correlation, “franchisee units opened per year.” The variance explained by the four
factors is slightly over 69%.
Only four groups emerge from the study (the unsuccessful franchisors group does
not appear). At first, this can seem to be logical, given the characteristics of the
database used, which was centered on successful franchising chains in Spain.
To study the differences between groups, the Kruskal–Wallis test was run. This is
a non-parametric test, which is the equivalent of one-way ANOVA when the
variables do not fulfill the requirements of normality. It has been verified that the
four groups differ significantly in the 13 analyzed variables, all of them presenting a
p-value equal to 0. That is to say, it can be affirmed that the groups of franchisors
obtained are homogeneous within each type and heterogeneous between each other.
Furthermore, as with Castrogiovanni et al. (1995) and López and Ventura (2001),
a cluster analysis has also been done to verify if the resultant groups of franchisors
are similar to those that arise with factor analysis.
With cluster analysis, one application was obtained with four groups and another
with five. Analyzing the four group cluster first, very different results come out from
factor analysis. In this respect, only two groups are somewhat similar using both
methodologies. Besides, a very big group appears with more than 60% of the sample
of companies and a very small one with only two franchisors.
With regard to the five group cluster, the analysis is even more complicated and
the convergence with the groups that appeared in other studies is not viable.
In view of these outcomes, the results coincide with Castrogiovanni et al. (1995)
commentaries, in reference to the scarce convergence between the groups formed by
cluster analysis compared to those that arise from factor analysis.
The second factor analysis was applied to the first 16 variables (listed in Table 4).
In the second column of Table 6 the results obtained using the first 16 indexed
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variables are shown. The rotated factor matrix (using an orthogonal rotation), after
six iterations, reveals the existence of four factors whose eigenvalues are over one.
The results of both analyses (considering 13 or 16 variables) are identical with the
exception of the second one which includes three additional variables. The same four
strategic groups are kept, though they change the order of the factors. The variance
explained by all four factors is slightly over 66% in comparison with 69% obtained
Table 5 Factor analysis with varimax rotation with 13 variables
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
05.Average investment 0.809
06. Entry Fee 0.808
07. Royalty (percentage of sales) 0.709
08. Advertising fee (percentage of sales) 0.761
11. Age of the company 0.990
12. Years franchising 0.775
13. Years not franchising 0.835
01. Number of outlets 0.776
02. Percentage of outlets located in Spain −0.807
03. Outlets opened per year 0.814
10. Percentage of franchised units 0.467
04. Outlets opened per year from the beginning of the
franchise chain
0.610
09. Contract length (years) 0.903
Eigenvalues 3.11 2.51 2.27 1.08
Variance explained 23.96 19.35 17.43 8.29
Cumulative variance 23.96 43.31 60.74 69.03
Table 6 Factor analysis with varimax rotation. Comparing 16 vs. 13 variables
Factor
loadings
(16 variables)
Factor
loadings
(13 variables)
Strategic group: “Conservative and expensive”
05. Average investment 0.823 0.809
06. Entry Fee 0.834 0.808
07. Royalty (percentage of sales) 0.716 0.709
08. Advertising fee (percentage of sales) 0.659 0.761
16. Minimum surface of the place 0.605 Not included
14. Minimum population required 0.530 Not included
Strategic group: “Matures”
01. Number of outlets of the chain in the world 0.710 0.776
02. Internationalization −0.744 −0.807
03. Outlets opened per year 0.676 0.814
10. Percentage of franchised units 0.632 0.467
Strategic group: “Rapid Growers”
04. Outlets opened per year from the beginning of the franchise chains 0.722 0.610
09. Contract length (years) 0.855 0.903
15. Total shops in Spain 0.839 Not included
Strategic group: “Re-converted”
11. Age of the company 0.976 0.990
12. Years franchising 0.588 0.775
13. Years not franchising 0.857 0.835
Variance explained 66.15 69.03
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using 13 variables. The variables “16. Minimum surface” and “14. Minimum
population” positively load on the strategic factor called expensive and conservative.
Logical results are provided since a major surface or population required for the
opening of a unit needs a higher franchisee investment. The variable “15. Total shops
in Spain” loads on the factor of rapid growers. This aspect also totally agrees with the
sense that franchising provides a rapid growth to firms that adopt it.
The study has continued trying to include both remaining variables (sector or
industry and distribution strategy) that should be considered of great importance for
our purposes. To analyze if the groups obtained for the whole sample differ between
each of three different sectors and if these sectors behave differently from one to the
other is extremely important. Equally, two analyses for the distribution strategy
considering the alternative of multi-channel in comparison with the alternative mono-
channel (for companies that use only franchisee units) have been applied.
The results of these five analyses are summarized in Table 7 (columns 3–7) and
they can be compared to the study of the whole sample gathered in the second column.
Some differences between sectors and distribution strategy can be appreciated
from Table 7. Analysing the three columns of sectors five strategic groups come out,
not four as in the case of the whole sample. Also, the variables included in each
strategic group vary depending on the sector and the distribution strategy. This fact
indicates that including both the aforementioned strategic variables, added to the
other three, is absolutely necessary to achieve good classifications of franchisor
types. As many previous studies have not taken them into account, their results
might be confusing. Especially so, when firms of different sectors have been
included in the samples.
As in the first study, the non-parametric test of Kruskal–Wallis was carried out. It
has been verified that the four groups differ significantly in the 16 analyzed
variables; all of them presenting a p-value lower than 0.05. That is to say, it can be
affirmed that the groups of franchisors obtained are homogeneous within each type
and heterogeneous with respect to the rest.
Discussion, implications for management, limitations and future research
Discussion
As previous studies showed, the existence of several strategic groups in the Spanish
franchising system can be corroborated and, therefore, different types of franchisors.
In this paper, four strategic groups have been identified, unlike the five that others
authors proposed.
Nevertheless, the results are consistent since our sample is made up of franchisors
with a high likelihood of future success. This would lessen the possibility of
obtaining a strategic group composed of unsuccessful franchisors.
One of the major implications of this study is that the variables included in each
strategic group vary depending on the sector and the distribution strategy. This fact
indicates that including sector and distribution strategy is absolutely necessary to achieve
good classifications of franchisor types. A description of them is offered in Table 8.
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In the following paragraphs the main characteristics of the groups are explained.
Group 1: “Expensive Franchisors.” This is the group that presents the highest costs
of adhesion (investment). Besides, the financial investments demanded
from the franchisees such as entry fee, sales royalties and advertising fee,
minimum population and minimum size of the place present higher
values than in any other group.
The difficulties of control of the franchisor, due to the geographical dispersion of
the outlets, according to the agency theory, makes the franchisors demand a few high
financial considerations from the franchisees in order to avoid opportunist behavior.
Table 7 Comparing strategic groups
Whole
sample
Retailing Service Hotels and
restaurants
Multi-
channel
Mono-
channel
Strategic group: “Expensive and conservatives”
05. Average investment 0.823 0.862 0.580 0.758 0.800 0.764
06. Entry Fee 0.834 0.607 0.766 0.825 0.824
07. Royalty 0.716 0.593 0.624 0.744 0.747
08. Advertising fee 0.659 0.614 0.706 0.795
16. Minimum surface 0.605 0.846 0.586 0.888 0.815
14. Minimum population 0.530 0.788 0.440
10. Percentage of franchisees −0.710
12. Years franchising 0.909
09. Contract length 0.729
Strategic group: “Matures”
01. Number of units 0.710 0.937 0.843 0.842
02.Internationalization −0.744 0.603 −0.671 −0.900 −0.861 −0515
03. Units per year 0.676 0.902 0.836 0.811
10. Percentage of franchisees 0.632 0.462 0.747
12. Years franchising 0.794 0.670 0.603
06. Entry Fee 0.609
14. Minimum Population 0.617
Strategic group: “Rapid Growers”
04.Franchisees per year 0.722 0.925 0.876 0.933 0.930 0.920
09. Contract length 0.855 0.684 0.655
15. Units in Spain 0.839 0.929 0.938 0.748 0.912 0.892
01. Number of units 0.962 0.553
03. Units per year 0.945 0.561
Strategic group: “Re-converted”
11. Age of the company 0.976 0.951 0.881 0.878 0.965 0.975
12. Years franchising 0.588 0.720
13. Years not franchising 0.857 0.937 0.950 0.918 0.950 0.843
08. Advertising fee 0.526
10. Percentage of franchisees −0.806
Strategic group: “Unknown”
08. Advertising fee 0.898
07. Royalty 0.577
09. Contract length −0.684 0.754
14. Minimum Population 0.586 −0.813
16. Minimum Surface 0.681
10. Percentage of franchisees −0.671
Variance explained 66.15 80.89 74.70 80.44 74.77 72.98
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With regards to their age, they are the third oldest companies (12 years). This
justifies them being able to demand a higher entry fee in consideration of a better
brand equity, know-how, etc. The duration of the contract (9 years) is also the second
highest, justifying greater investment of adhesion requested from their franchisees.
This group is very similar to the conservative expensives from the Carney and
Gedajlovic (1991) article.
Group 2: “Re-converted.” They are franchisors that have been exercising their
commercial activity for many years (34 years on average), turning them
into the oldest group of the sample by far. They have not managed to get
an important number of outlets, which leads to them being the group
with a minor number of units. They present, moreover, a very limited
growth. It is the group that has adopted franchising later (after 22 years).
In spite of this, and given their age, they have been operating in
franchising longer. This group is like the converters from the Carney and
Gedajlovic (1991) study.
Group 3: “Mature.” This is the group that presents the second highest number of
outlets, 2,210 units on average. They are international companies present
in a wide number of countries. Their annual growth of outlets is good,
which justifies the search for new markets to be able to support the
rhythm of expansion. The annual growth of franchised units in Spain is
high too. These are the franchising chains that provide the contracts of
less duration (6 years). This group is very similar to the mature
Table 8 Differences between types of franchisors in Spain
Expensive
(27)
Matures
(21)
Rapid
Growers (8)
Re-converted
(16)
Mean
01. Number of outlets 959 2.210 2.215 490 1.359
02. Internationalization 85.09 26.66 69.71 76.94 64.53
03. Shops opened per year 30 223 235 12 105
04. Shops opened per year from the
beginning of the franchise chains
4.3 8.2 70.5 2.5 12.4
05. Average investment 218.928 86.064 29.177 103.169 133.368
06. Entry Fee 24.772 14.238 751 11.097 15.992
07. Royalty (percentage of sales) 4.41 3.04 0.25 1.57 2.92
08. Advertising fee (percentage of sales) 2.46 2.04 0.00 1.18 1.78
09. Contract length (years) 9.41 6.52 17.00 7.31 8.94
10. Percentage of franchised units 74.05 89.57 96.58 68.72 79.09
11. Age of the company 12 13 11 34 17
12. Years franchising 9 10 8 13 10
13. Years not franchising 3 3 3 22 7
14. Minimum Population 63.963 33.143 7.063 38.313 42.951
15. Total shops in Spain 69.1 104.9 703.75 109 158.9
16. Minimum surface 183 75 26 87 113
Sector 1: Retailing (percentage) 11.1 33.3 62.5 68.8
Sector 2: Hotel-restaurant (percentage) 18.5 47.6 37.5 18.8
Sector 3: Services (percentage) 70.4 19 0 12.5
Multi-channel strategy (percentage) 66.7 33.3 25 68.8
Mono-channes strategy (percentage) 33.3 66.7 75 31.3
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franchisors from Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) and carbon-copy from
the Johnson and Alon (2006) articles.
Group 4: “Rapid Growers.” These are the franchisors that have the lowest age
(11 years), though they have adopted franchising almost immediately.
Following the principles of franchising, they are the franchisors that
offer a longest contract (17 years). In spite of their youth, they have a
very high number of outlets and the highest number of shops in
Spain.
The name “franchisors in rapid growth” justifies itself because the growth is very
high. The franchised units opened per year (average 70.5) have the highest growth of
all the groups. The growth of the total units is also very high. To be able to grow
rapidly, they present the lowest cost of adhesion of all the groups regarding initial
investment, entry fee, sales royalties and advertising fee. This group is like the
equally named “rapid growers” from Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) and the
“entrepreneurial” from Johnson and Alon’s (2006) studies.
To conclude, the existence of strategic groups in the Spanish franchising is verified,
coinciding with previous research (Carney and Gedajlovic 1991; Castrogiovanni et al.
1995; López and Ventura 2001; Combs et al. 2004).
The main contribution of this work is that the strategic groups vary depending on
the sector and the distribution strategy. This fact indicates that including both the
aforementioned strategic variables, added to the other three new variables included
in the study, is absolutely necessary to achieve good classifications of franchisor
types. Furthermore, these new variables should be taken into account in future
research about strategic groups on franchising.
Managerial implications
The study of strategic groups is an essential tool to analyze the competitive structure
of any sector of activity. In franchising, certain variables (investment, entry fee,
royalties, geographical dispersion, etc.) are considered to be explanatory factors of
managerial behavior. These variables, which sustain the creation of mobility barriers
in the sector, are the origin of the strategic groups within franchising. These results
lead us to affirm that franchising, more than a sector of activity, is a form of trade
that can be used in any sector of activity as a strategy of growth. Also, it can differ
depending on the supporting strategic variables.
We highlight the fact that the results obtained in the group of franchisors differ
according to the applied methodology. Therefore, the groups that arise from the
factor analysis present many differences from those originated by the cluster
analysis. However, to look for strategic groups the utilization of the factor analysis is
more advisable than the cluster analysis, as Nath and Gruca (1997) commented.
The important issue is not only the application of a certain methodology for the
search of strategic groups, but to wonder if the variables that were chosen to carry out
the abovementioned groups are really explanatory of the managerial behavior. That is
to say, are they of a strategic nature? When this occurs, the different managerial
behaviors of the companies included in the different strategic groups might explain the
divergent results in terms of sales growth, profitability, market share, etc.
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It is relevant to analyze the different groups conformed including the variables
sector and distribution strategy because they may make up different groups of
franchisors.
Limitations and future research
Like any research, this study contains limitations that can help us to orientate future
research. The first limitation comes from the size and type of the sample, since it
only includes franchising chains whose future seems to be successful. Furthermore,
they have consolidated themselves in their competitive sector; they possess a wide
experience, etc. This bias in the sample prevents generalizing the results completely,
though the truth is that, in general, they are very similar to those obtained by
previous studies. This limitation leads us to plan a new study using all the
information of the franchising chains that operate in Spain. Also, to extend the study
to other countries in order to generalize the results would be helpful.
The second limitation comes from the variables selected for the configuration of
the strategic groups. Their strategic nature is not in doubt. Nonetheless, the
likelihood of comparison to previous articles has led us to not include variables that
might be of great importance in explaining the managerial behavior such as: the
degree of internationalization, the risk associated with the franchising, etc. This
constitutes a new challenge for future research.
A third limitation is caused by the database used in the research. The chains
included in the Supplement of the National Magazine “Emprendedores” are selected
by their likelihood to future excellence or success, and this aspect might provoke the
“Unsuccessful” group not appearing in this study.
Finally, the results highlight that though the obtained groups are heterogeneous with
respect to the rest and homogeneous within each type, this does not mean that within the
groups companies partially different to others still continue existing. In this respect, it is
necessary to carry out qualitative studies of the companies included in every group and
to verify if some differences continue existing in their behavior and performance.
Appendix
Notes
1. Within every factor the variables whose absolute value is over 0.7 were
supported, with the exception of those variables whose higher value does not reach
the abovementioned figure. In this case, the variable in the factor that has a major
load is showed.
2. The royalties and advertising fees that are fixed quantities have been
transformed into percentages. How much this fixed fee, royalty or advertising
means with regard to the first year’s foreseen sales volume has been calculated. This
information of foreseen sales volume has been obtained from the 2004 Yearbook of
‘Tormo & Asociados.’ When this data has been missing, the procedure used was the
following one: dividing the global volume of business by the number of outlets in
Spain and calculating the percentage of this value.
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3. When unlimited duration is indicated in the contracts, 25 years have been
considered, compared with other studies that raise this figure to 100 years.
4. The authors want to acknowledge the useful and worthy reviewers’ comments
and suggestions.
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